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Case No. 20090842-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Allen Nelson, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for distributing or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance. This Court has jurisdiction under the pour-over 
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion for 
a mistrial? 
Standard of Review. This Court '"review[s] a trial court's denial of a motion for 
mistrial for abuse of discretion/" State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 345, f 5, 57 P.3d 
1134 (quoting State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 38, 993 P.2d 837). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statute is reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by amended information with distributing or 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance, cocaine, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2008). R15. The State alleged that Defendant 
had prior convictions for violation of the same statute and therefore charged the 
offense as a first degree felony. Id. 
The trial court held a bifurcated trial. The court conducted a jury trial on the 
charge that Defendant had distributed or arranged to distribute cocaine. See R33-34, 
53; R65:3-71. The jury found Defendant guilty. R53; R65:70. The court then 
conducted a bench trial on the prior conviction element. See R34; R65:72-73. The 
court found that Defendant had a prior second degree felony conviction for 
violating Utah Code Ann. § 58~37-8(l)(a). Id. 
The Court therefore entered a first degree felony conviction and sentenced 
Defendant to an indeterminate prison term of five years to life. R57-58. Defendant 
timely appealed. R59. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The offense 
On May 10, 2009, narcotics detective Steven Bigelow, wearing plain clothes 
and driving an undercover car, pulled up to a corner near Pioneer Park in Salt Lake 
City. R65:16-21. He saw two males, Defendant and a juvenile, standing within a 
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few inches of each other, "pretty much touching." R65:21-23. Bigelow made eye 
contact with Defendant, parked his car, and rolled down his car window. R65:21. 
Defendant asked Bigelow, "What do you need?" Id. Bigelow answered, "I need a 
20." Id. A "20" is slang for $20 worth of crack cocaine. R65:18. 
Defendant then nudged the juvenile, who looked nervous, towards the car. 
R65:21,23. The juvenile opened the passenger door and jumped into the passenger 
seat. R65:21. The juvenile said nothing. R65:21-22. Bigelow again said that he 
"needed 20," but the juvenile did not appear to understand. R65:22. Defendant 
yelled, "Give him the 20. Give him the 20." Id. At that point, the juvenile spat out a 
plastic twist containing crack cocaine, and Bigelow and the juvenile "did the deal in 
the car." Id. The juvenile got out of the car and stepped back next to Defendant. Id. 
Detective Bigelow drove away and radioed in the takedown signal. R65:22, 
39. The takedown unit arrived within 30 seconds. R65:27. Bigelow made a U-turn 
and drove back close to the takedown site to make certain that the unit had arrested 
"the right people." R65:39-40. 
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Tlte motion for mistrial 
After seating the jury, the trial court provided the jurors with preliminary jury 
instructions and read Instructions Nos. 1 to 18 to the jury. See R65:3; R74:2-ll.] 
Instruction No. 5, based on the information, set forth the charge: "DISTRIBUTION 
OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,... § 58-37-
8(l)(A)(ii), Utah Code Ann., as follows: That on or about March 10, 2009, at 575 
West 200 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant having been 
previously convicted under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a), did knowingly and 
intentionally distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or agreed, consented, 
offered, or arranged to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, to wit: 
Cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance/' R39; cf. R15. 
After reading the first four instructions, the trial judge began reading 
Instruction No. 5. R74:5. While reading, he noted that the instruction included the 
statement about Defendant's previous conviction. See id. He did not read that 
portion of the instruction, but instructed the jurors, "[L]et's just skip that, and you 
1
 The transcript of the jury trial does not include a transcript of the court 
giving the jury instructions. See R65:3, 51. A transcript of the court's giving the 
instructions was prepared later and included in the record. See R74 (inside one of 
the two envelopes included in the record). 
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may cross that out. That has been stricken. If you have a pen, do so." R74:5. The 
judge continued, "So that it should read, The [defendant], did knowingly and 
intentionally distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or agreed, consented, 
offered or arranged to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, to wit, 
cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance." Id. 
The judge then continued on to Instruction No. 6. Id. 
After the judge completed reading Instructions Nos. 1 to 18, defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial. R65:4. Counsel argued that the reference to a prior conviction 
in Instruction No. 5 was prejudicial error. Counsel claimed that even though the 
court had not read the instruction, the jurors had seen it in the written copies they 
were following. Id. He claimed that because the charge "state[d] that [Defendant] 
had been previously convicted of a similar crime ... [it] [wa]s going to highly 
prejudice the jury." Id. He claimed that it would deprive Defendant of a fair trial in 
violation of his rights to due process. Id. The prosecutor countered that the error 
could be cured by an explanatory or cautionary instruction. R65:5. 
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial. R65:6. The court determined 
that it would provide a curative instruction indicating that the erroneous language 
came from "the Court's inclusion from stock instructions," and "was not [a part] of 
the charge in this case." R65:6. The court would clarify that "no evidence [would 
be] presented on any [prior conviction or] anything akin to it." R65:6. Id. The court 
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also noted that the instruction did not name the offense associated with the previous 
conviction. Id. 
Before closing argument, the court discussed Instruction No. 27A, its 
proposed curative instruction, with counsel. R65:48. Defense counsel objected that 
an adequate curative instruction was not possible and renewed his motion for a 
mistrial. R65:49. The trial court gave the instruction, implicitly denying the 
renewed motion. See R65:51; see also R74:14-15. The instruction read: "The Court 
previously instructed you to delete certain language in [instruction No. 5, which 
you've done. This Court prepared [instruction No. 5 from a standard set of 
instructions, and inadvertently included the language you've been asked to delete 
from another instruction. It's not part of this charge, was inadvertently included in 
it, and no evidence has been presented in this case to support such a statement. 
Accordingly, you should disregard that language." Id, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant cannot prevail on his claim that the trial court should have granted 
his motion for a mistrial after the court inadvertently included a reference to 
Defendant's prior conviction in its written Instruction No. 5, which set forth the 
charge as included in the information. First, the jury was never improperly 
instructed. The court noted the error in the written instruction before he reached the 
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challenged reference, told the jury to cross it out, and read the instruction without 
the challenged language. 
Moreover, even if error occurred, it was not prejudicial. First, the charge did 
not name the prior offense. Second, the jurors were instructed that the charge was 
not evidence and that they were not to consider it in reaching their verdict. Third, 
the court gave a strong curative instruction explaining that the challenged language 
had been taken from another instruction, was not part of the charge in this case, and 
was inadvertently included in the instruction here. The curative instruction also 
told the jurors that no evidence had been presented in this case to support the 
statement and, accordingly, they should disregard the stricken language. The courts 
normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible 
evidence. 
Finally, the error was not prejudicial because, in the context of the 
overwhelming evidence presented of Defendant's guilt, there is no reasonable 
likelihood of a result more favorable to Defendant, absent the alleged error. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT DENIED DEFEND ANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL 
Defendant argues that th^ trial court erroneously referenced a prior 
conviction in its instruction setting forth the charge against him. He claims that the 
reference to the conviction deprived him of a fair trial and that the court should 
have granted his motion for a mistrial. Defendant cannot prevail on this claim 
because there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the reference there would have 
been a more favorable result for Defendant. 
Relevant law. When a trial court denies a motion for a mistrial based on an 
incident during trial, this Court"will not find that the [trial court's] decision was an 
abuse of discretion" //[u]nless a review of the record shows that the court's decision 
is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant 
cannot be said to have had a fair trial." State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 345, f 12, 57 
P.3d 1134 (quoting State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 38, 993 P.2d 837) (additional 
citation and internal quotation omitted). 
The burden of showing harm or prejudice for non-constitutional error rests 
with the defendant. See State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1,194,63 P.3d 731 ("[tjhe burden 
of showing [harm] rests on the complaining party"). Accordingly, reversal is 
appropriate only if Defendant can establish that "the error is substantial and 
prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there 
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would have been a more favorable result for the defendant/' State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 1071,1073 (Utah 1989). 
The trial court has various tools by which it can remedy errors. See State v. 
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998). "[C]urative instructions are a settled and 
necessary feature of our judicial process and one of the most important tools by 
which a court may remedy errors at trial/' Id. at 271. "If a trial judge could not 
correct errors as they occur, few trials would be successfully concluded. Moreover, 
our judicial system greatly relies upon the jury's integrity to uphold the jury oath, 
including its promise to follow all of the judge's instructions." Id. at 272 (emphasis 
in original). Errors in eliciting the fact of a prior conviction and even its underlying 
offense can be rendered harmless by curative instructions. See State v. Colwell, 2000 
UT 8, \ \ 35-38, 994 P.2d 177. 
"[W]e normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard 
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an 
'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be unable to follow the court's 
instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be 
'devastating' to the defendant." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273 (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 
U.S. 756, 767 n.8 (1987)) (internal quotation omitted). 
In addition, overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt may render error 
harmless. See State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, t 33, 220 P.3d 136 (holding error in 
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admitting Gallegos's incriminating statements was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt "in light of th[e] overwhelming evidence of [his] guilt"); State v. Ford, 2007 UT 
App 357U, *1 ("no prejudice could have resulted from evidence of Ford's prior 
felony conviction, given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt"). 
Analysis. Here, Defendant has not shown that the error, if any, was 
prejudicial. First, no error occurred. The jury was not told that Defendant had been 
convicted of a prior offense. While written Instruction No. 5 indicated that 
Defendant was charged with distributing, having been previously convicted of an 
offense under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), the trial court noted the error 
before ever reading the phrase and told the jury that the language had been stricken 
and should be crossed out. R74:5. The court then read the instruction without the 
challenged language. See id. Thus, the jury was never instructed that Defendant 
was charged with having a prior conviction, much less that he had one. 
In addition, the trial court gave its stock instruction informing the jury that 
the accusation, or the filing of formal charges, is not evidence of guilt. See id. at 6; 
see also R40. In giving Instruction No. 9, the judge explained, "[N]ow I'll tell you 
some things which do not qualify as evidence, or which for some good reason you 
should not consider in reaching your verdict. The fact that formal charges have been 
filed accusing [Defendant] of committing a crime is not evidence of guilt." R74:6 
(emphasis added); see also R40. Thus, even had the challenged language been 
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included, which it was not, the jury was told not to consider the charge in reaching 
its verdict. 
But even if error did occur, it was harmless. As a preliminary matter, the 
challenged language did not even name the offense for which a prior conviction 
might have been entered. More significantly, the trial court remedied any error 
when, after both sides rested, the court gave a strong curative instruction. 
Instruction No. 27A stated, 'The Court previously instructed you to delete certain 
language in Instruction No. 5 which you have done. The Court prepared Instruction 
No. 5 from a standard set of [instructions and inadvertently included the language 
you have been asked to delete from another [instruction. It is not a part of this 
charge, [it] was inadvertently included in it, and no evidence has been presented in 
this case to support such a statement. Accordingly, you should disregard that 
language." R48. 
Thus, the jury was given an explanation for the presence of the stricken 
language in the original written instruction that reasonably accounted for its 
presence in the instructions without suggesting that Defendant did, in fact, have a 
prior conviction. In addition, the court clarified that "no evidence ha[d] been 
presented in this case to support such a statement." Id. Finally, the jury was again 
instructed to "disregard that language." Id:, see also Dolbin v. United States, 2010 WL 
1904528, *10 (M.D. Pa.) (slip opinion) (reproduced in Addendum B) (although 
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indictment included a reference to Holbin's prior conviction, Holbin suffered no 
prejudice where court gave curative instruction explaining indictment was not 
evidence and not to be considered in determining guilt). 
As explained, appellate courts "normally presume that a jury will follow an 
instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it." 
Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273 (citation and internal quotation omitted). Even if the jurors 
might otherwise have considered the stricken language of Instruction No. 5 to have 
some bearing on this case, we must presume that they followed the court's 
instruction to disregard it. Considering the court's reasonable explanation and its 
strong caution, Defendant cannot demonstrate, as he must, "an 'overwhelming 
probability'" the jury would have been unable to follow that instruction or "a strong 
likelihood" that the effect of the challenged language would have been 
"'devastating'" to him. Cf. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 1073 (affirming Johnson's conviction 
and denial of motion for mistrial; rejecting claim that the court's inadvertent 
reference to two counts instead of one "may have caused the jury to speculate 'as 
to ... what the second count would be for"'). 
Any error is also harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. 
Here, the State did not claim that Defendant personally distributed a controlled 
substance, but that he agreed, consented, offered, or arranged for the juvenile to 
distribute it. See R65:52-56. The State presented unchallenged evidence of the 
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elements of that offense: (1) that Defendant"agreed, consented, offered or arranged 
to distribute ... Cocaine/' and (2) that he did so "intentionally and knowingly/' 
R49; see also Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8. Detective Bigelow testified that on the night 
of the incident he was driving an undercover car in the area surrounding Pioneer 
Park and a nearby shelter, an area frequented by drug sellers and purchasers, and a 
location where Detective Bigelow had personally made "close to 200 [drug] buys." 
R65:17-21. He saw two males, Defendant and a juvenile, standing together—within 
twenty inches of one another—on a corner. R65:21,23. Bigelow stopped his car and 
rolled down the passenger window. R65:21. He and Defendant made eye contact. 
Id. Defendant asked, "What do you need?" Id. Bigelow answered, "I need a 20." 
Id. Defendant then nudged the juvenile toward the detective's car. " Id. A "20" is a 
drug trade expression for twenty dollars worth of cocaine. R65:18. 
The juvenile then got into the detective's car, and the Bigelow repeated his 
request for the 20. R65:21-22. The juvenile was nervous and did not appear to 
understand. R65:22, 23. But Bigelow could hear Defendant yelling, "Give him the 
20. Give him the 20." R65:22. At that point the juvenile spat from his mouth a 
plastic twist containing what later tested to be crack cocaine. Id.; see also R65:45. The 
juvenile then got out of the car and returned to Defendant R65:22. 
Bigelow drove away and radioed in the takedown signal. R65:22, 39. The 
takedown unit arrived within 30 seconds. R65:27. Bigelow made a U-turn and 
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drove back close to the takedown site to make certain that the unit had arrested the 
right individuals. R65:39-40. This evidence abundantly demonstrated the elements 
of the offense. 
In defense, counsel argued that the State had called only one witness and had 
not shown why Defendant would have arranged the distribution. R6557-66. These 
matters are tangential. But, in any case, Defendant did not take the stand or present 
any witness to offer a different account. See R65:45-48. More significantly, 
Defendant presented no testimony to suggest that Detective Bigelow was not 
credible. See id. And he presented no witness to contest the key testimony in the 
case, namely, that Defendant (1) asked the detective. "What do you need?"; 
(2) nudged the juvenile toward the detective's car; and (3) yelled out, "Give him the 
20!" See id. And he presented no argument that Defendant's question, "What do 
you need?" and his exclamation, "Give him the 20!" could have some meaning 
unrelated to the drug trade. See R65:57-66. Under these circumstances, the evidence 
against Defendant was essentially unchallenged and overwhelming. As a result, 
Defendant could not and did not demonstrate that, absent the alleged error, a 
different result would have been probable. 
In sum, if error occurred, Defendant has not shown that it was prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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Respectfully submitted August \L. 2010. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
/ 
JEANNE B. INOUYE / & 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Westlaw 
Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8 (Westlaw 2008) 
c 
^ ^ WestTs Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
Chapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos) 
r § 58-37-8. Prohibited acts—Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to know-
ingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, of-
fer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; 
or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in 
any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d 
that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of 
Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are un-
dertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the person 
occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of manage-
ment . 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, 
or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second de-
gree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first de-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8 
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gree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a 
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a 
second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (1)(a)(ii) or 
(iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by 
law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76- 10-501 was 
used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during 
the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sen-
tence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concur-
rently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less 
than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sen-
tence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course 
of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, 
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intention-
ally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or 
distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is 
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, 
is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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( m ) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from 
any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person1s conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to 
a conviction under Subsection (1)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one de-
gree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(l) with respect to all other con-
trolled substances not included in Subsection (2) (b) (i) , ( n ) , or ( m ) , including 
less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a sec-
ond conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or 
subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(l) while inside the exte-
rior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in 
Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sen-
tenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if 
the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in: 
(l) Subsection (2)(b) , the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an inde-
terminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) tue court shall additionally sesterce the person corvicted to a term of ere 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indetermi-
nate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and 
( n ) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an inde-
terminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the 
person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and not concur-
rently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2) (a) ( n ) or (2) (a) ( m ) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
( n ) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
( m ) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an of-
fense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having m his 
body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
( n ) operates a motor vehicle as defined m Section 76-5-207 in a negligent man-
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ner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death 
of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those de-
scribed in Subsection (2) (h) (ii), or a controlled substance classified under 
Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 
58-37-4(2) (a) (iii) (S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Prohibited acts C--Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled sub-
stance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to 
another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to as-
sume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, 
apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any 
person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure 
the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another 
source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled 
substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other 
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or 
other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of 
the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third de-
gree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D—Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized un-
der this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, 
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Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 
37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penal-
ties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the 
act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of 
any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on 
the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-
501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, 
playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of 
where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, de-
livery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate 
or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b)(i) A person convicted unaer this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the pen-
alty that would otherwise have been established but for this Subsection (4) would 
have been a first degree felony. 
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the per-
son is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have 
been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person con-
victed under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum 
penalty prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a 
violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
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(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted 
for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indetermi-
nate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, 
acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly 
or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intention-
ally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor 
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of 
the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mis-
takenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in 
Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as 
described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (1)(b) and (2)(c), a plea 
of guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance 
under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, 
even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with 
the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, notwith-
standing a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this chap-
ter . 
(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not 
in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another 
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for 
the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dis-
pensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the per-
son or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or sub-
stances . 
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
J.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8 
Page 7 
Df his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, 
Dr administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be admin-
istered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision. 
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or 
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investiga-
tional new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of profes-
sional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his 
employment. 
(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any 
Indian, as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports 
peyote for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the prac-
tice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in Subsection 58- 37-2(1)(w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as de-
fined in Subsection 58-37-4(2) (a) (iii) (V), it is an affirmative defense that the 
peyote was used, possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional 
ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian relig-
ion. 
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirma-
tive defense under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than 
ten days prior to trial. 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for 
good cause shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of 
timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection 
(12) by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a 
complete defense to the charges. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any 
person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be 
given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
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Minors, suspension of driver's license for certain offenses, see § 78A-6- 606. 
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203. 
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204. 
Right to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Controlled Substances >-^ 20 to 51. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 96Hk20 to 96Hk51. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
ALR Library 
118 A.L.R.Fed. 567, Permissibility Under Fourth Amendment of Detention of Motorist 
by Police, Following Lawful Stop for Traffic Offense, to Investigate Matters Not 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
* * 
'est law 
Slip Copy. 2010 WL 1904528 (M.D.Pa.) 
(Cite as: 2010 WL 1904528 (M.D.Pa.)) 
HOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
M.D. Pennsylvania. 
Mark R. DOLBIN, Movant 
v. 
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent. 
Civil Action No. l:03-cr-00118. 
May 11, 2010. 
West KeySummary 
Criminal Law 110 N- /***"^ 1898 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXXI Counsel 
11 OXXXI(C) Adequacy of Representation 
110XXX1(C)2 Particular Cases and Issues 
1 IQkl898 k. Severance of Charges. 
Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's trial counsel's failure to move to sever 
charges against defendant did not render counsel's 
assistance ineffective. Defendant was arrested after 
former cohort cooperated with police in drug traffick-
ing sting operation, and convicted of conspiracy to 
distribute and possess methamphetamine, distribution 
and possession with intent to distribute metham-
phetamine, possession of firearms by a convicted 
felon, and obstruction of justice. In light of the over-
whelming evidence against defendant including for-
mer cohort's testimony which was bolstered by that 
of investigators, there was no reasonable probability 
that the jur\fs verdict would have been d'Sf^rcni if 
counsel had made a successful motion to sever the 
charges against him. 
Christy H, Fawcett U.S. Attorney's Office, Hams-
burg, PA, for Respondent. 
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*1 Before the Court is Movant Mark Dolbin's motion 
to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence brought pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C § 2255. (Doc. No. 250.) Since 
filing his initial motion alleging ineffective assistance 
of trial and appellate counsel and improper jury in-
structions, Dolbin amended his § 2255 motion to add 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at his pre-
liminary hearing. (Doc. No. 253.) For the reasons set 
forth below, the motion will be denied. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Movant Mark Robertson Dolbin was indicted on May 
14, 2003, for conspiracy to distribute and possess 
with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of 
methamphetamine. as well as distribution and posses-
sion with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of 
methamphetamine. (Doc. No. 1.) The indictment was 
subsequently amended multiple times to include the 
charges of possession of firearms by an armed career 
criminal, obstruction of justice, and forfeiture, result-
ing in the fourth and final superseding indictment 
being filed on August 4, 2004. (Doc. No. 121.) Dol-
bin pleaded not guilty and went to trial, along with 
co-Defendant Ly Bun Mey, on March 7, 2005. (Doc. 
Nos.127, 182.) On March 10, 2005. the jury returned 
a verdict against Dolbin on four counts: conspiracy to 
distribute and possess methamphetamine. distribution 
and possession with intent to distribute metham-
phetamine, possession of firearms by a convicted 
felon, and obstruction of justice. (Doc. No. 200, at 1.) 
The jury found co-Defendant Mey not guilty.— On 
July 25. 2005. Dolbin was sentenced to life in prison. 
(Doc. No. 199.) Dolbin successfully appealed that 
sentence and was re-sentenced to 240 months m 
prison on August 20, 2007. (Doc. No. 233.) 
FN1. In Court, Roger Frey, one of the Gov-
ernment's key witnesses, misidentified Mey 
in court. (Trans 2. at 188.) Additionally, 
Mey testified on his own behalf that, while 
he knew the passenger in his car possessed 
drugs, he did not possess or distribute drugs. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1904528 (M.D.Pa.) 
(Cite as: 2010 WL 1904528 (M.D.Pa.)) 
(Trans. 4 at 36-47.) 
Dolbin filed a "consolidated application to proceed in 
forma pauperis" on February 1, 2008, in response to 
which this Court sent a notice of election. (Doc. 
Nos.239, 243.) Dolbin returned the notice of election 
indicating his desire to file one, all-inclusive § 2255 
motion at a later date. (Doc. No. 244.) Dolbin then 
filed a motion to extend time to file his § 2255 mo-
tion, but attached the "working copy" of his motion 
to vacate thereto. (Doc. No. 248, 250.) To preserve 
the filing date of the motion to vacate, the Court or-
dered that the attachment be docketed as a § 2255 
motion and later allowed Dolbin leave to supplement 
the claims he had already included in his § 2255. 
(Doc. No. 253.) The Government has now responded 
to all of Dolbin's claims, and Dolbin has replied to 
the Government's arguments. Dolbin's motion to va-
cate, set aside,, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255, is now before the Court for disposi-
tion. 
H. DISCUSSION 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
At trial, Dolbin was represented by Attorney Nicho-
las Quiim. Dolbin alleges that Quinn was ineffective 
for failing to move to sever the charges of conspiracy 
and drug possession from the felon in possession of 
firearms and obstruction of justice counts. (Doc. No. 
251.) Specifically, Dolbin contends that revelation to 
the jury of his fifteen-year-old convictions "and other 
concomitant spillover evidence" was improperly 
prejudicial and contributed to the jury verdict against 
him. Dolbin also argues that Quinn should have 
moved to sever his trial from that of co-Defendant Ly 
Bun Mey. Dolbin admits that Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 8 provides for "liberal joinder" of 
claims against one Defendant and joint trials against 
multiple Defendants, but argues that his counsel 
should have moved for relief from joinder and for 
severance pursuant to Rule 14 because joinder of the 
claims against him was, in this case, prejudicial. 
*2 To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, a defendant must show that his counsel's per-
formance was deficient, which is to say that it "fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness," and 
that he was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient per-
formance. Outten v. Kcamcv, 464 F.3d 401. 414 (3d 
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Cir.2006) (citing Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 
668. 687. 104 S.Ct. 2052. 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). 
Because failure to establish either prong results in 
denial of a defendant's claim, a court may begin its 
analysis with either prong of the test. United States v. 
Cross, 308 F.3d 308. 315 (3d Cir.2002). In assessing 
counsel's conduct, there is a "strong presumption" 
that counsel acted reasonably, and "a court deciding 
an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the rea-
sonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the 
facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of 
counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. 
With respect to the prejudice prong, a defendant must 
prove that "there is a reasonable probability that, ab-
sent the errors, the factfinder would have had a rea-
sonable doubt respecting guilt." Id at 695. 
1. Dolbin was not Prejudiced by Counsel's Alleged 
Errors 
The Court takes up its analysis of Dolbin's claim with 
the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Though 
Dolbin's brief suggests reasons counsel may have 
stipulated to his past convictions, moved to sever the 
claims against him, and moved to bifurcate the trial, 
Dolbin has not shown that, but for counsel's decisions 
on these matters, there is a probability the jury would 
have found him innocent of the crimes charged. This 
is true whether the Court considers the prejudice es-
tablished by each of these alleged deficiencies indi-
vidually or all the issues alleged cumulatively. See 
Fahv v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169. 205 (3d Cir.2008) ("In-
dividual errors that do not entitle a petitioner to relief 
may do so when combined, if cumulatively the preju-
dice resulting from them undermined the fundamen-
tal fairness of his trial and denied him his constitu-
tional right to due process."). 
The evidence that supports Dolbin's guilty verdict is, 
simply put, immense. The Government's first witness, 
Agent Tyer, testified that a man by the name of 
Roger Frey was discovered transporting drugs during 
a drug interdiction stop of a bus in Colorado. (Trans. 
2 at 34-60.) Frey confessed to the crime and cooper-
ated with the Government, eventually admitting that 
he was delivering the drugs to the person later identi-
fied as Mark Dolbin, a Pottsville, Pennsylvania resi-
dent. (Id.) 
Next, Roger Frey himself testified. Frey confessed 
that he was transporting methamphetamine for Mark 
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Dolbm Frey testified that he met Dolbm through a 
cousin, saw him in possession of large quantities of 
cash, and knew him to be a methamphetamme dealer 
before they began working together (Id at 65-70) 
Fiey further testified in detail that he took a trip to 
California, purchased methamphetamme with money 
that was sent to him m pizza boxes, gave the 
methamphetamme to a man named "Blaze" to trans-
port back to Pennsylvania, reconnected with Blaze in 
Pennsylvania, and then personally transfened four 
pounds of methamphetamme to Mark Dolbm (Id at 
71-81 ) Fiey also testified that he purchased drugs for 
Dolbm a second time Frey testified that for the sec-
ond trip, Dolbm gave him $55,000 m cash to take to 
California to purchase five more pounds of metham-
phetamme (Id at 88-91 ) Frey explained to the jury 
that federal authorities intercepted him m Colorado 
with the methamphetamme in his suitcase, but that he 
cooperated with the police and agreed to complete 
the drug transaction with Dolbm (Id at 91-97 ) Un-
der police surveillance, Frey called Dolbm to make 
arrangements for Dolbin to letneve him, and the 
drugs, at the Hamsburg bus station (Id) Frey testi-
fied that Dolbin arrived at the bus station at the ap-
pointed time in a blackish Mercedes (id at 9b ) Frey 
stated that, while wearing a wire and being observed 
by police, he placed the luggage containing the 
methamphetamme — m the trunk of the Mercedes, 
and entered Dolbin's vehicle (Id at 96-97 ) Frey tes-
tified that he was m the Mercedes with Dolbin when 
police officers attempted to stop the vehicle, and 
Do!Dm evaded them by initiating a high-speed car 
chase (Id at 99 ) Frey explained that Dolbin eventu-
ally abandoned the \ ehicle and fled on foot m an at-
tempt to avoid arrest (Id) Last, Frey testified that 
Dolbin had used two firearms m the course of their 
transactions, one of which was a Stieetsweeper rifle 
that Dolbin brandished for the purpose of showing 
Frey "that he had fire power " (Id at 101-03 ) 
FN2 The police had actually replaced the 
rrethamphetarrme with a non-controlled 
substance though Frey testified he was un-
awai e of this fact at the time he completed 
the transaction with Dolbin (Tians 2 at 99 ) 
*3 The Government also introduced a tape recoidmg 
that w as made of the conversation between Frey and 
Dolbin when Dolbm picked Frey up fiom the bus 
station (Id at 104) That recording memorialized 
Dolbin referring to * crystal" and making ' five out of 
four " (Id) Frey testified that both of these references 
were related to methamphetamme (Id at 104-05 ) 
Next, the Government produced testimony from DEA 
Agent John Langan Langan stated that he observed 
the controlled purchase between Frey and Dolbin at 
the Hamsburg bus station (Id at 163-65 ) Langan 
identified Dolbin as the man m the Mercedes who 
picked Frey up from the bus station, and stated that 
he observed the two depart the bus station together m 
the Mercedes with Fie>'s suitcase-and the sham 
methamphetamme-m the trunk (Id at 165-66 ) 
Lower Paxton Township Police Officer Alonzo Piper 
testified that he arrested Maik Dolbm when Dolbm 
was attempting to hitch a ride to Pottsville from a 
location two miles from the scene where the high-
speed car chase had ended the previous day (Id at 
170-71 ) Piper made the arrest because Dolbin 
matched the description given by the officers in-
volved in the chase of the man who had fled (Id at 
172) 
D E \ Agent Joseph Mye^s testified that be was a^o 
involved in the arrest of Mark Dolbm Agent Myers 
stated that he tested the package of white powder 
initially found in Colorado in Roger Frey's luggage 
The substance was determined to be approximately 
five pounds of crvstal methamphetamme (Id at 175-
78 ) Agent Myers also discussed his observations of 
the monitored calls between Frey and Dolbm dunng 
which Frey made plans with Dolbin to meet at the 
Hamsburg bus station (Id at 182-83 ) Myers further 
testified that he was part of the effort to follow Dol-
bin's Mercedes fi om the bus station, stop the \ ehicle, 
and arrest Dolbm (Id at 185-89) M s^ers described 
the high-speed chase that ensued wherein Dolbin 
drove m excess of 100 miles per hour and into on-
coming traffic in an attempt to evade police (Id) 
Agent Myers also testified that he later executed a 
search warrant on a storage unit rented in Dolbin's 
name (id at 1°2 ) In tfie storage unit M* eTs unco\-
ered two fnearms and a stolen >ellow Mercedes Benz 
with a broken trunk (Id at 193-^4 ) 
Karlene DiCello Dolbin s fiancee also testified 
against Dolbin She admitted that Dolbin called her 
after he was arrested and asked her to remo\e from 
their residence a gun and a scale (Id at 211 ) She 
had been unaware these items were in the home, so 
she asked James Connois, a friend of Dolbin s, to 
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remove them. (Id.) DiCello testified that, even after 
Connors removed one firearm and a scale from the 
home, police executed a search warrant on the house 
and found approximately Si0.000 in cash and another 
firearm. (Id. at 212-215.) DiCello also told the jury 
that, after Dolbin's arrest, he called to tell her that he 
had a yellow Mercedes in a storage unit and that 
there was money for her in the trunk. (Id. at 215-16.) 
*4 Byron DiCello, Dolbin's stepson, testified that he 
had been asked to remove "baggies" from his house 
at his mother's request after Dolbin's arrest. (Id. at 
228-33.) He also revealed that he had once acciden-
tally seen a cooler full of white powder at his home, 
though he could not confirm that the substance was 
methamphetamine. (Id.) 
The Government next produced the testimony of Ed-
ward Hunt, Dolbin's cell mate at Cumberland County 
jail. Hunt testified that Dolbin gave him a note to 
hold during a cell search. (Id. at 235-37.) Hunt, in 
turn, gave the note to prison authorities. The note was 
addressed to "Jack," which is the name of one of 
Mark Dolbin's brothers. The note stated that Dolbin 
would have cash in ten days to pay an attorney and 
asked Jack to remove firearms being stored in his 
aunt's former bedroom in his mother's house. (Id. at 
237.) The note also requested that Jack retain Attor-
ney Dimitriou on Dolbin's behalf. (Id.) Attorney 
Dimitriou did in fact enter an appearance for Dolbin 
on June 5, 2003. (Doc. No. 14.) In a separate inci-
dent, Dolbin asked Hunt to collect approximately 
$60,000 in drug debts for Dolbin so that Dolbin 
would have money to pay his legal fees. (Trans. 2 at 
239-40.) At the time, Dolbin and Hunt both believed 
Hunt was on the verge of being released. (Id.) Hunt 
testified that he wrote down the names and addresses 
of the two debtors from whom Dolbin told him to 
collect the money. (Id. at 242-43.) In later testimony, 
Cameron Dolbin confirmed that the two men identi-
fied by Hunt were known friends or acquaintances of 
his brother. Defendant Mark Dolbin. (Trans. 3 at 13.) 
Both notes were produced for the jury. 
James Connors, self-described as Dolbin's best 
friend, testified next. Connors admitted that he re-
moved a scale and a rifle from Dolbin's resident at 
DiCello's request, and that he eventually turned those 
objects over to the police. (Trans. 2 at 255-57.) Con-
nors further stated that DiCello asked him to go to a 
storage unit rented by Dolbin to recover money from 
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the trunk of a car located within. (Id. at 258.) Con-
nors explained that, with the help of Mark Dolbin's 
brother, Cameron, and others, he broke into the stor-
age unit and pried open the trunk of a yellow Mer-
cedes. (Id. at 260-61.) He admitted that he recovered 
satchels containing over $40,000 cash, metham-
phetamine, and multiple handguns from the car. (Id. 
at 261-63.) He hid one satchel himself and gave an-
other to Cameron Dolbin for disposal. (Id. at 264.) 
They left one shotgun in the car, however, because 
they did not want to risk someone seeing the larger 
shotgun in their own vehicle once they left the prem-
ises. (Id.) 
Cameron Dolbin also testified. His account echoed 
Connors' account of breaking into his brother's stor-
age unit. (Trans. 3 at 6-8.) He stated that they re-
moved three bags from a yellow Mercedes, and the 
bag he took possession of contained several hand-
guns. (Id. at 10.) 
*5 DEA Agent Michael Mish testified that when he 
executed a search warrant on a different storage facil-
ity rented by Defendant Dolbin, he found telephone 
bills and other documents with Mark Dolbin's name 
on them. (Id. at 24.) Mish also found a recipe for how 
to manufacture methamphetamine and a video enti-
tled "Cookin' Crank with Uncle Fester" in the unit. 
(Id. at 25-26.) The Government produced copies of 
these documents and items at trial. (Id. 25-26.) 
DEA Agent Barrett was able to corroborate the testi-
mony of many of the Government's prior witnesses. 
Barrett corroborated Roger Frey's testimony that 
Dolbin wired Frey money via Western Union through 
the records of the money transfer. (Id. at 60-61.) Bar-
rett corroborated the testimony of other DEA Agents 
when he stated that he, too, observed Frey and Dolbin 
in a black Mercedes at the Harrisburg bus station, 
which eventually resulted in a high-speed car chase. 
(Id. at 37-40.) Barrett corroborated James Connors' 
testimony that Connors turned over to me police a 
rifle and scale which Connors said had been removed 
from DiCello and Dolbin's residence. (Id. 43-45.) 
Barrett corroborated the testimony of Ed Hunt when 
he explained that he recovered in excess of a dozen 
firearms in Dolbin's aunt's bedroom, located within 
Dolbin's mother's home. (Id. 46-47.) Barrett corrobo-
rated Cameron Dolbin when he stated that he recov-
ered a black bag containing three handguns hidden 
under leaves near Cameron Dolbin's house. (Id. 50.) 
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Barrett also corroborated DiCello's testimony that 
$10,000 cash and a shotgun were found at her resi-
dence. (Id. at 42-43.) The shotgun found was identi-
fied as a Streetsweeper, which matched Frey's de-
scription of the firearm Dolbin had shown to him. 
Last, as Defendant points out in his brief, Agent Bar-
rett did testify that Defendant had prior convictions: a 
1985 conviction for possession with intent to deliver 
drugs, 1987 convictions for possession with intent to 
deliver drugs and possession of a prohibited offensive 
weapon, and a 1987 conviction for "causing or risk-
ing a catastrophe." (Id. at 62-64.) No details related 
to these offenses were disclosed, and they were not 
expounded upon in any way. 
The Government also produced testimony of Ceven 
Huer Kong. Kong, known by the nickname "Lazy," 
admitted he did not know Mark Dolbin, but he cor-
roborated Roger Frey's testimony related to how Frey 
made his purchases of methamphetamine in Califor-
nia. (Id. at 143.) Kong testified that he sold four 
pounds of methamphetamine to Roger Frey on one 
occasion and five more pounds on a second occasion. 
(Mat 150, 152.) 
To say the least, the evidence against Defendant Dol-
bin was significant. Even if Defense Counsel Quinn 
had made a successful motion to sever the charges 
against Dolbin, bifurcate the trial, or had stipulated to 
the prior offenses, the Court cannot find any reason-
able probability that the jury's verdict would have 
been different in light of the tremendous amount of 
evidence against Dolbin. Even if a separate trial had 
been held on each charge and no evidence of any past 
conviction or other crime had been admitted, the end 
result would assuredly remain unchanged. 
*6 The Court arrives at this conclusion not only in 
light of the sheer number of witness accounts which 
inculpated Dolbin on each of the four charges, but 
with particular consideration of the way the different, 
unrelated witnesses' accounts corroborated each 
other, fit together, and were enhanced by the direct 
evidence produced through the police investigation. 
For example, Frey's testimony was corroborated by 
documentation, receipts, and phone records in addi-
tion to the testimony of DEA Agents and Kong. Mul-
tiple agents were able to testify as to their personal 
knowledge of different aspects of Frey's testimony, 
bolstering it tremendously. Moreover, the testimony 
of Dolbin's friends and family was consistent not 
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only with itself and the recorded phone calls and in-
tercepted message Dolbin made to them, but also 
with the evidence police found during the investiga-
tion of Connors' home, the storage units, and Dolbin's 
residence. Lastly, the recorded statements of Dolbin 
speaking about "crystal" and questioning Frey as to 
how to make "five out of four" were particularly 
damning. The compelling and thorough nature of the 
evidence provided against Dolbin as to not only the 
drug trafficking charges, but also the possession of 
firearms charge and the obstruction of justice charge 
simply makes untenable Defendant's claim that any 
prejudice which may have resulted from inclusion of 
his past convictions, Quinn's failure to bifurcate or 
sever the charges, and Quinn's failure to act on the 
litany of other unsupported grounds referred to in 
passing in Defendant's brief. Because Dolbin cannot 
show even a small likelihood that the verdict ren-
dered would have been different had counsel pursued 
a different trial strategy, his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim must fail. 
2. Counsel's Performance was not Deficient 
Notwithstanding Dolbin's failure to demonstrate 
prejudice, the Court also notes that Dolbin's argument 
that Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 
sever his trial from that of co-Defendant Mey does 
not hold water. (Doc. No. 187.) First, Mey and Dol-
bin were charged as part of the same conspiracy, thus 
the claims were properly joined under Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 8. See United States v. Eufra-
sio. 935 F.2d 553. 567 (3d Cir.1991). Although Rule 
14 provides that "if it appears that the defendant... is 
prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants 
... the court may order an election or separate trials," 
Dolbin has not shown any prejudice that resulted 
from the joint trial, a prerequisite for a successful 
motion to sever. Fed.R.Crim.P, 3 4. Counsel cannot 
be deemed ineffective for failing to make a motion 
that would have been deemed unsuccessful. Eufrasio, 
Q?5 F.2d at 56$ (requiring a defendant to demonstrate 
that failure to sever resulted in ''clear and substantial 
prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial" to 
succeed on such a claim). 
Though Mey testified, his testimony did not touch in 
any way upon the likelihood of Dolbin's guilt or the 
believability of witnesses against Dolbin. If anything, 
Mey's testimony benefitted Dolbin because, if be-
lieved, it provided impeachment evidence against 
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Frey, a primary Government witness implicating 
Dolbin Moreover, the jury was clearly able to com-
partmentalize the evidence produced against Mey and 
the evidence produced against Dolbin since they ar-
n\ed at two distinct verdicts for the two Defendants 
Lnited States x De Pen, 7^8 F 2d 963 984 (3d 
Cir 1985) ("The proper question on appeal is whether 
the jury could have been reasonably expected to 
compartmentalize the allegedly prejudicial evi-
dence ") Dolbin has not demonstrated that a mo-
tion to sever his trial from that of Mey would have 
been meritorious, thus Attorney Qumn cannot be 
deemed ineffective for failing to make such a motion 
*7 Likewise, Dolbm's argument that Attorney Qumn 
was ineffective for failing to move to sever the fire-
arm, drug trafficking, and obstruction of justice 
charges is unavailing Evidence of weapons would 
ha\e been admissible against Dolbm at a trial for 
drug trafficking, and vice versa, thus a motion to 
sever would have had little chance of success Evi-
dence of firearm use has been recognized as "tools of 
the naicotics trade," allowing at least some evidence 
of firearm use to be admitted as circumstantial evi-
dence of drug trafficking m drug trafficking trials 
e\ en u hen not charged as a separate offense United 
States ^ Russell 134 F 3d 171 183 (3d Cir 1Q98) 
("[l]t has long been recognized that firearms are lele-
\ ant evidence m the prosecution of drug-related of-
fenses, because guns are tools of the drug trade ") 
Conversely, possession of drugs has been held ad-
missible in a firearms possession case as evidence of 
a motive to possess firearms See United States \ 
Goiecki, 813 F 2d 40 42-43 (3d Cir 1987) (denying 
motion to sever claim because "possession of the 
weapon would likely be admissible in the drug case" 
and Rule 404(b) would admit evidence of drug traf-
ficking as motive not to register weapons), see also 
United States ^ Moiena 547 F 3d P I (3d Cir 2008) 
(admission of some evidence of diug transactions 
acceptable under Rule 404(b) to show motive, but 
o\c*n^e rnav cause incurable prejudice) Indeed the 
testimony relating to the fiiearm possession charges 
and the diug trafficking charges overlapped, indicat-
ing that the judicial consideiations of efficiency 
weighed m favor of joining the claims because man) 
witnesses would have had to testify twice Eufiasw 
Q3^ F 2d at 568 (discussing that, m determining a 
motion to sever, the trial court should consider the 
public interest m judicial economy as well as preju-
dice to the defendant) Thus, any motion to sever the 
firearm from the drug trafficking claims would have 
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been nonmentonous 
Dolbm's argument that Attorney Qumn should have 
moved to sever the obstruction of justice charge is 
incorrect for the same reason Dolbm's attempts to rid 
his residence of drug and firearm evidence would 
likely have been admissible in a trial only charging 
his drug distribution or his firearm possession be-
cause it is evidence that he participated m drug distri-
bution and possessed firearms Also, due to the fact 
that the obstruction of justice was linked to his fire-
arm possession and drug trafficking, the interrelated 
nature of the charges w ould have made a bifurcated 
trial inefficient, and complete separation of all evi-
dence of drug and gun use from the obstruction at-
tempt impossible 
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that, 
even when taking all alleged facts as true and m the 
light most favorable to Defendant Dolbin Dolbin has 
not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by Defense 
Counsel's performance Not only would motions to 
sever or bifurcate the trial have had little chance of 
success, but the evidence presented against Dolbin on 
each count was overwhelming and aid not bear soiely 
on the credibility of one or two witnesses, thus it 
cannot be said that prejudice, rather than the e\i-
dence, resulted m the verdict against him See 
Moiena ^47 F 3d at 196 (stating that if a case against 
a defendant is strong and the evidence overw helming, 
improperly-admitted premdicial evidence does not 
violate due process) 
B. Clear Error in Jury Instructions/Ineffecthe 
4ssistance For Failing to Challenge Jury Instruc-
tions 
*8 Dolbin argues that the jury instructions used at 
tiial m Counts III and IV uclated his right to due 
process Counts III and IV of the Fourth Superseding 
Indictment charged Dolbin with 'possession of fne-
arms by an armed caieer criminal m violation of 18 
U S C H 922(g) and 924(e) and with obstruction of 
justice m violation of 18 U S C frfi ni2 'c)n)-(2) 
and 2 Dolbin first alleges that the instructions the 
Court provided for tnese charges lmpermissibh re-
lieved the Government of its burden of proof that he 
was convicted of three or moie crimes punishable by 
more than one year because the instructions implied 
that Dolbin s prior criminal convictions w ere "estab-
lished fact" Dolbin also contends that the Courts 
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instruction that flight may be taken as consciousness 
of his guilt improperly implied that the flight may be 
taken as evidence of his guilt as to the felon-in-
possession charge as well as the obstruction of justice 
charge, in addition to the drug trafficking charges. He 
also argues that the wording of the instruction im-
plied that he had already been convicted of commit-
ting the crimes charged. Last, Dolbin alleges that the 
submission to the jury of a summary chart prepared 
by the Government was so prejudicial as to violate 
his due process rights. 
To succeed on a claim of a trial error that is raised for 
the first time on collateral review, a defendant must 
show that there was "cause" for the failure to raise 
the issue on direct appeal and that there was "preju-
dice" resulting from the failure, or, that he is actually 
innocent of the crimes charged. Hodge v. United 
States, 554 F.3d 372. 379 (3d Cir.2009). If a defen-
dant cannot meet either requirement, the claim will 
be dismissed as procedurally defaulted. Id. 
Dolbin's initial motion does not appear to allege 
cause and prejudice from the failure to object to the 
jury instmctions on the above-mentioned bases at 
trial. Yet, in his "objections" to the Government's 
brief in opposition to his S 2255 motion, he requests 
that the claim be considered as part of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. An allegation that de-
fense counsel was ineffective may satisfy the cause 
requirement of this test. Id. Accordingly, in constru-
ing the motion in the light most favorable to Dolbin, 
a pro se litigant, the Court will examine the claims of 
improper jury instructions as additional claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel-that Attorney Quinn 
was ineffective for failing to object to the jury in-
structions on the bases mentioned in Dolbin's motion. 
With respect to Dolbin's first challenge, that the jury 
instructions relieved the Government of its burden of 
proof on the felon-in-possession charge, the Court 
clearly instructed the jury that the Government has 
the burden of proof as to each element of each of the 
crimes charged. The Court re-emphasized this direc-
tive at least seven more times in the course of the 
closing jury instructions. (Trans. 4 at 101, 102, 110, 
112-113, 123, 132.) In discussing the charge that 
Dolbin possessed firearms and ammunition as a con-
victed felon in violation of 18U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 
924(e), the Court specifically instructed: 
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*9 In Count 3, the Defendant Mark Robertson 
Dolbin is charged in the fourth superseding indict-
ment with being a previously convicted felon in 
possession of firearms and ammunition. Ly Bun 
Mey is not charged with this crime. 
Specifically, Count 3 of the indictment reads, 
Beginning at a time unknown to the grand jury and 
continuing through approximately June 1 st, 2003, 
in Dauphin County and Schuylkill County, Penn-
sylvania, within the Middle District of Pennsyl-
vania and elsewhere, the Defendant Mark Robert-
son Dolbin, having been convicted in the Schuyl-
kill County Court of Common Pleas of three or 
more violent felonies or serious drug offenses or 
both in the following cases, Number 257-CA-1984, 
Number 748-CA-f981, Number 12-CA-1982, 
Number 27-CA-1982, which are crimes punishable 
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, 
did knowingly possess in and affecting commerce 
firearms and ammunitions as listed below. 
You will see in the copy of the indictment that's 
provided to you that there are nine firearms listed 
there in the indictment. The indictment alleges that 
Mr. Dolbin was in possession in violation of Title 
18. United States Code, Section 922(g)(1) and 
924(c). 
The crime of being a felon in possession of fire-
arms has three essential elements: First, that the de-
fendant has been convicted of a crime punishable 
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; 
secondly, that the defendant thereafter knowingly 
possessed firearms and ammunition; and, finally, 
that these firearms and ammunition were trans-
ported across the state line at some time during or 
before the defendant's possession of them. 
You're instructed that possession with intent to 
deliver drugs, possession of a prohibited offensive 
weapon, and causing or risking a catastrophe are 
each crimes punishable by imprisonment for more 
than one year under the laws of Pennsylvania. 
These are the crimes of which the defendant is al-
leged to have been previously convicted. 
If you have found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the firearms and ammunition in question were 
manufactured in a state other than Pennsylvania or 
internationally and that the defendant possessed the 
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firearms and ammunition m Pennsylvania, then you 
may, but you're not required to, find that they weie 
transported across the state line The term "fire-
arm" means any weapon which will or is designed 
to or ma\ be readily converted to expel a piojectile 
by the action of an explosive 
The crime of being a previously convicted felon 
m possession of firearms or ammunition is a gen-
eral intent crime, not a specific intent crime That 
means that the Government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly 
possessed the firearms and ammunition in question 
The Government is not required to prove the de-
fendant knew that it was unlawful for a previously 
convicted felon to possess firearms 
(Trans 4 at 128-31 ) The record indicates, then, that 
the jury was instructed that the three or four convic-
tions testified to by Agent Barrett all carried a penalty 
of one or more years m prison The Court did not 
instruct the jurors that they needed to conclude that 
Dolbin was convicted of the prior crimes, or that he 
possessed firearms and ammunition Simply put. the 
Court instructed the jury as to an apparent stipulation 
entered into by the parties-that the crimes for which 
Dolbin was allegedly convicted each earned a sen-
tence of one or moie years-to minimize prejudice to 
Dolbin that might arise from stating more details le-
lated to the alleged convictions or the precise terms 
for which he was imprisoned Similarly, the Court 
instructed the jury as to the parties' stipulation that 
the weapons were manufactured outside Pennsyl-
vania but emphasized that the jury could determine 
whether they weie transported across state lines (Id 
at 111-12) Dolbin has not shown any way that the 
lury instructions on this charge impropeily abdicated 
the Government's burden of pi oof Attorney Quinn 
uas not ineffective for failing to raise this issue In-
deed, as set forth m detail m the preceding section, 
the overwhelming e\ idence presented against him at 
tnal would prevent tne Court from finding prejudice 
even m the event such decision was enoioneous 
*10 Dolbin next argues that it uas prejudicial for the 
indictment to state 
Defendant Mark Roberston Dolbin, hawng been 
comicted in the Schuylkill County Court of Com-
mon Pleas of three or moie uolent felonies or seri-
ous drug offenses or both m the following cases 
which are crimes punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year, did knowingly possess in 
and affecting commerce firearms and ammunition 
as listed below 
{Id at 128-29) Though the indictment does include 
such a statement, the jury was instructed that the in-
dictment was not to be taken as proof or evidence of 
the crimes charged therein Specifically, the Court 
stated, "I remind you, jurors, that an indictment itself 
is not e\ idence It merely describes the charges made 
against the defendants It is an accusation It may not 
be considered by you as any evidence of the guilt of 
either defendant" {Id at 114 ) This curative instruc-
tion combined w ith the Court's explanation that Dol-
bm's prior convictions were an element of one of the 
crimes charged by the Government, indicates that 
Dolbin was not prejudiced such that the Court would 
have any reasonable suspicion the outcome of the 
trial would have been different absent the presenta-
tion of that information to the jury 
The Court now turns to Dolbin's complaint that he 
was prejudiced when the Court referred to him as "a 
pre\ lously convicted felon" m the discussion of trie 
obstruction of justice charge {Id at 131 ) Since being 
a previously conducted felon is not relevant to his 
guilt regarding the obstruction of justice chaige, un-
necessary reiteration of this fact has the possibility of 
causing some prejudice to Defendant However, the 
jury had already been presented with evidence that 
Dolbin had a prior criminal history and was a con-
victed felon Given that evidence of his past felony 
convictions was admissible m reference to the felon 
m possession of firearms count, the Court finds that 
the meie reference to his criminal history one addi-
tional time was not unduly prejudicial It is implausi-
ble that this additional refeience to Dolbin s criminal 
history affected the outcome of Dolbm's case, in light 
of the mountain of evidence against him 
Defendant also takes issue with the Courts instruc-
tion that flight from law enforcement ma> oe taken as 
circumstantial evidence of guilt (Id at 132) The 
instruction stated 
Turors, vouve heard evidence concerning Defen-
dant Mark Robertson Dolbm's flight from law en-
forcement agents on May 12th 2003, following his 
alleged commission of crimes as charged by the 
Government Evidence of the defendants flieht af-
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ter a ci lme has been committed may be considered 
by you to prove the defendant's consciousness of 
guilt Whether or not evidence of flignt shows a 
consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, 
to be attached to such circumstances are matters 
solely for your determination 
(Id at 131-32) Courts have consistently held that 
evidence of flight is admissible and may be inter-
preted as an indication of consciousness of guilt 
United States v Gieen, 25 F 3d 206 (3d CirlQ94) 
(evidence of defendant's flight was properly admitted 
to show consciousness of guilt when defendant fled 
upon spotting federal authorities), United States v 
Miles 468 F 2d 482 489-90 Hd Cn 1972) (finding 
proper trial judge's instruction that flight may be 
deemed evidence of guilt) In this case, the instruc-
tion was warranted because Roger Frey and several 
law enforcement officers testified that Dolbm at-
tempted to flee from law enforcement by initiating a 
high-speed car chase, abandoning his vehicle, and 
evading police on foot The instruction given by the 
Court is almost synonymous with that currently rec-
ommended by the Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury 
Instructions — See Tmrd Circuit Criminal Tury In-
structions 4 30 
FN3 The model instruction reads as fol-
lows "You have heard testimony that after 
the crime was supposed to have been com-
mitted, [Dolbm evaded police attempts to ar-
rest him ] If you believ e that [Dolbm fled 
police], then you may consider this conduct, 
along with all the other evidence, m decid-
ing whether the government has proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt tnat he committed 
the crime charged Whether or not this 
evidence causes you to find that the defen-
dant was conscious or his guilt of the crime 
charged, and whether that indicates that he 
committed the crime chaiged, is entirely up 
to you as the sole mdges of the facts " Third 
Circuit Criminal Tun Instiuctions 4 30 
*11 Though Dolbm argues that the Court's use of the 
definite pronoun "the" rather than the indefinite pro-
noun "a" prejudicially implied that he definitively 
had committed the alleged crime and did flee, rather 
than leav mg those questions for the jury's determina-
tion The Court disagrees Taken as a whole, the in-
struction does not imply that evidence of Defendant's 
flight need be accepted, that the Government had 
affirmatively proved that Defendant committed the 
crimes alleged, or that me evidence of flight neces-
sarily indicated Defendant's guilt Rather, the instruc-
tion informed the jury that they could, at their own 
discretion, take the evidence related to Defendant's 
flight and use it as evidence that Defendant knew he 
had committed the crimes chaiged Moreover though 
the instruction did not indicate which enmes the evi-
dence of flight may indicate Defendant was con-
scious of, Dolbm's contention that it improperly im-
plied the jury may take the evidence of flight as evi-
dence of the obstruction of justice charge is mentless 
Tunes are assumed to "attend closely the particular 
language of the trial court's instructions m a criminal 
case and strive to understand, make sense of, and 
follow the instructions given them " I rated States v 
Hernandez, 176 F 3d 719 734 (3d Cir 1999) (quoting 
FT anus v Franklin, All US 307 324 105 S Ct 
1965 85 LEd2d 344 (1985)) It is not rational for 
anyone to conclude that flight which occurred befoie 
a crime is alleged to have occuned could be an indi-
cation of consciousness of guilt for the subsequent 
came Accordingly, the Court finds that Dolbm has 
not shown this jury instruction to be prejudicial in 
any way, and Defense Counsel was not deficient for 
failing to object to it 
Last, Dolbm argues that admission of the Govern-
ment's summary chart, effectively a time line of w hat 
the Government argued happened in the case, was 
prejudicial and should not have been admitted The 
Court notes that the chart w as not initially submitted 
to the jury with the other exhibits (Trans 4 at 145 ) 
Rather, the jury requested to see the chart during de-
liberations (Id) Defense Counsel Quinn did object to 
the submission of the chart to the jury, but his objec-
tion was overruled (Id at 146 ) To the extent Dolbm 
argues that Quinn was ineffective for making onl> a 
"weak" objection, which lesultcd in Ins objection 
being overruled, this aigument fails (Id at 147 ) Af-
ter determining that trie chart contained a concise 
time line of what the Government believed it had 
proved and was supported by evidence presented at 
trial, the Court admitted the chart into the jury room 
as an exhibit The Court included the following cau-
tionary instruction with the chart 
The chart or time line contains a summary of what 
the Government believes the evidence m the case 
established As I instructed you earlier, the detei-
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mination of the facts in the case is yours. The chart 
will be provided to you with the understanding that 
it represents the Government's summary of what it 
believes is the evidence. 
*12 (Id. at 147.) The Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
has upheld the introduction of summaries or charts as 
a means to clarify an abundance of evidence. See 
United States v. Svme. 276 F.3d 131. 151 (3d 
Cir.2004); Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury In-
structions 4.10 & 4.11. The Government created the 
time line, and the Court admitted it, to help the jury 
organize the information presented. A jury is pre-
sumed to follow the Court's instructions, and the in-
structions clearly provided that the chart was not evi-
dence, but rather a summary of the Government's 
case. The instruction emphasized that it was for the 
jury to determine whether the facts alleged on the 
chart occurred. Thus, particularly when considered in 
light of the strongly-worded admonition to the jury 
that the chart was not evidence, but rather a summary 
of the Government's view of the case, the Court finds 
that Dolbin was not prejudiced by its admission. 
Accordingly, Dolbin's arguments that the jury in-
structions violated his right to due process or were 
the result of ineffective assistance of counsel will be 
denied. 
C. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
On appeal, Dolbin was represented by Damien 
Schorr. Dolbin contends that Schorr was ineffective 
for failing to argue on appeal that Dolbin's trial coun-
sel was ineffective. This argument is meritless be-
cause ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim that 
is ordinarily considered only in collateral proceed-
ings. United States v. Thornton. 327 F.3d 268. 271 
(3d Cir.2003) ("It has long been the practice of this 
court to defer the issue of ineffectiveness of trial 
counsel to a collateral attack/'). While a claim of 
ineffective assistance may be considered on direct 
appeal in the rare circumstances where the record is 
sufficient to allow determination of the issue, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that even in 
such instances, the better practice is to consider the 
claim first at the district court level in collateral pro-
ceedings. Id.; see also Mas saw v. United States. 538 
U.S. 500. 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003). 
Indeed. Dolbin has now properly raised the issue and 
has had a chance to litisate his ineffective assistance 
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of counsel claims. Both because he has brought such 
claims before the Court in this motion and because 
the Court has found them non-meritorious, Dolbin 
cannot claim that he was prejudiced by appellate 
counsel's failure to raise his ineffective assistance 
claim on direct appeal. 
D. Preliminary Hearing Counsel's Conflict of In-
terest 
Last, Dolbin alleges an ineffective assistance claim 
against pre-trial Defense Counsel Emmanuel Dimit-
riou. Attorney Dimitriou represented Dolbin at the 
pretrial stage from June 5, 2003, until December 19, 
2003. (Doc. Nos.14, 59.) While representing Dolbin, 
Dimitriou advised Dolbin to participate in a proffer 
session with the Government. Dimitriou also filed a 
motion to suppress evidence, but withdrew from the 
representation prior to argument on the motion. (Doc. 
Nos.15, 54.) Dimitriou sought recusal from the case 
on two bases: potential conflict of interest and break-
down of communications between attorney and cli-
ent. Dimitriou explained that James Dennison, a for-
mer client, would be a potential witness for the Gov-
ernment against Dolbin. (Doc. No. 54 % 8.) Dimitriou 
stated that continued representation of Dolbin would 
result in a violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 1.9, which states that an attorney who 
has formerly represented a client shall not thereafter 
represent another person in a similar matter with in-
terests materially adverse to the former client. Dimit-
riou's withdrawal motion also explained that Dolbin 
had failed to pay him a nonrefundable retainer and 
failed to comply with his advice, which led to dete-
rioration of the relationship between attorney and 
client. (Id. ffi[ 15-16.) Dolbin suggests that Dimit-
riou's loyalty to Dennison created an actual conflict 
of interest that existed prior to his withdrawal and 
that the conflict was materially adverse to Dolbin's 
best interests because the proffer session did not re-
sult in a plea bargain. Dolbin urges the Court to find 
that Dimiiriou's advice that Dolbin enter into a prof-
fer session with the Government was motivated by 
Dimitriou's desire to help Dennison. 
*13 Claims that counsel had an actual conflict of in-
terest with the defendant are generally cognizable in 
§ 2255 proceedings. United States v. Morena, 547 
F.3d 191. 198 (3cTcir.2008). In this case, the alleged 
conflict stems not from joint representation, but mul-
tiple representation, which means an actual conflict is 
aim to Oris. US Gov. Works. 
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less likely to exist. Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 
197 (3d Cir.2001) ("Actual conflict is more likely to 
occur in cases of joint representation (of co-
defendants at the same trial) than in cases of multiple 
representation (of co-defendants at separate trials)."). 
Also, a potential conflict of interest is insufficient to 
support a Sixth Amendment violation. Id. To prove a 
conflict of interest that violates the Sixth Amend-
ment, a defendant must show "1) multiple representa-
tion that 2) created an actual conflict of interest that 
3) adversely affected the lawyer's performance." 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 
135 (3d Cir.1984). A court must make the determina-
tion of whether the conflict violates the Sixth 
Amendment in consideration of the "circumstances 
surrounding the particular case." Id. at 134. Though 
prejudice will be presumed if the defendant shows an 
actual conflict of interest, a defendant must nonethe-
less demonstrate that there was a lapse in representa-
tion contrary to the defendant's interests. Palmer v. 
Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386. 398 (3d Cir.203 0); United 
States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064. 1070 (3d 
Cir.1988). A defendant can do this by 1) demonstrat-
ing a plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic 
that might have been pursued and 2) that such a tactic 
was inherently in conflict with the attorney's other 
loyalty. Gambim, 864 F.2d at 1070. 
Dolbin posits the following facts in support of his 
theory that a conflict of interest existed in violation of 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.— Attorney 
Dimitriou became aware of the potential conflict of 
interest arising from his representation of Dolbin and 
his prior representation of Dennison early-on in the 
case. Dolbin revealed to Attorney Dimitriou that 
Dennison was involved in the conspiracy, and Denni-
son had, likewise, come to Attorney Dimitriou for 
advice regarding his role in the conspiracy. Knowing, 
then, that Dolbin's proffer session with the Govern-
ment would likely reveal information about Denni-
son's involvement, Dimitriou nonetheless advised 
Dolbin to proffer with the Government so that Dolbin 
might receive a plea bargain capping his sentence at 
ten years. Plea negotiations between Dolbin and the 
Government fell through on or around October 8, 
2003. Dimitriou stated his intent to withdraw from 
Dolbin's representation by November 25, 2003. at the 
latest. (Doc. No. 50.) On or around December 2, 
2003, Attorney Dimitriou formally moved to with-
draw his appearance on behalf of Dolbin. (Doc. No. 
54.) On December 19. 2003, Dimitriou's motion was 
granted, and by December 22, 2003, Attorney Quinn 
was retained in his place. (Doc. No. 60.) Dolbin did 
not sign a plea agreement with the Government, went 
to trial, and did not testify on his own behalf because 
the Government would have used his proffer state-
ments to impeach him. 
FN4. The Court takes all facts alleged by 
Dolbin as true unless conclusively refuted 
by the record. Because the Court finds that 
the facts as alleged and records of the case 
show conclusively that Dolbin is not entitled 
to relief, there is no need for an evidentiary 
hearing. United States v. Day. 969 F.2d 39, 
41 (3d Cir.1992). Moreover, Attorney 
Dimitriou is unavailable for an evidentiary 
hearing, as he passed away prior to the filing 
of this motion. 
*14 Dolbin argues that these facts indicate that At-
torney Dimitriou's advice to talk to the Government 
demonstrates a conflict of interest and a decision ad-
verse to Dolbin's best interests. Yet. these facts also 
indicate that Attorney Dimitriou knew that any dis-
cussion Dolbin had with the Government would 
likely inculpate, rather than benefit, James Dennison. 
It is difficult, then, to understand how Attorney 
Dimitriou's suggestion that Dolbin implicate the per-
son Dimitriou was allegedly trying to protect demon-
strates an actual conflict of interest. 
First, Dennison was not indicted for the conspiracy 
with Dolbin and had, according to Dolbin's implica-
tions, been working with the Government from 
shortly after Dolbin's arrest. Though Attorney Dimit-
riou had been retained by Dennison in other matters, 
Dennison was not indicted for this conspiracy at any 
point, thus Dimitriou was not at any time represent-
ing codefendants in this same action. Moreover, to 
the extent Dolbin suggests that his proffer directly 
disadvantaged him because it bolstered the credibility 
of Dennison's potential testimony against him, Dolbin 
acknowledges that the Government would have been 
unable to use Dolbin's proffer statements for that 
purpose. The Government had agreed that Dolbin's 
statements could only be used against him at trial if 
he testified to materially different facts. (Doc. No. 
293 at 8.) In addition to being unavailable at trial for 
the purpose of bolstering Dennison's testimony, the 
statements were never used at all because Dennison 
was never called to testify against Dolbin. Dolbin 
simply cannot show from these facts that there was 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1904528 (M.D.Pa.) 
(Cite as: 2010 WL 1904528 (M.D.Pa.)) 
an actual conflict of interest or that Dimitriou's loy-
alty to Dennison had any ill-effect on his representa-
tion ofDolbin. 
Moreover, Dolbin has not posited a different defense 
strategy that could have been taken but would have 
worked to Dennison's detriment. The only other de-
fense strategy that could have been taken so early in 
the litigation would have been to not cooperate with 
the Government and to assert his Fifth Amendment 
right to silence. It is untenable that this strategy 
would have been adverse to Dennison's interests, and 
inconceivable that it could have been more damaging 
to Dennison's interests than the strategy actually ad-
vised by Dimitriou. A coincidence of interests is not 
tantamount to a conflict of interests. See Gawbino, 
864F.2dat 1071 ("[T]here is no conflict of interest... 
if an attorney at trial does not raise a defense on be-
half of his client because to do so is not in that cli-
ent's interest even though it is also in the interest of 
another client that it not be raised."). 
It is true that the proffer session made it difficult for 
Dolbin to testify at trial because he admitted to many 
of the charges against him. However, as Dolbin ad-
mitted in his brief, the initial strategy was to cooper-
ate with the Government so as to receive the benefit 
of a plea bargain and downward departures at sen-
tencing rather than to attend trial. In light of the sig-
nificant evidence against him, this strategy appears 
entirely reasonable. The Court further notes that the 
record indicates that Attorney Dimitriou did not sim-
ply abandon Dolbin amid important plea negotia-
tions. Instead, the record reveals that plea negotia-
tions between Dolbin and the Government had bro-
ken down by October 8, 2003. (Doc. No. 35 K 12.) 
Dimitriou did not move to withdraw from represent-
ing Dolbin until over a month later. (Doc. No. 54.) 
Further, Dimitriou arranged for another attorney to 
represent Dolbin at the arraignment for the Superced-
ing Indictment, which indicates that Dimitriou did 
not leave Dolbin without assistance at any key point 
m the proceedings. Dolbin was able to retain Attor-
ney Qumn within days of Attorney Dimitriou's for-
mal motion to withdraw. Thus the record refutes 
Dolbin's assertion that Dimitriou's decision to with-
draw from the case had, in itself, an adverse impact 
on his case. 
*15 The Court finds that Dolbin has not demon-
strated an actual conflict of interest by pretrial coun-
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sel Dimitriou that amounts to a violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to' counsel. 
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 
As required by Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Sec-
tion 2255 proceedings, the Court "must issue or deny 
a certificate of appealability when it enters a final 
order adverse to the applicant." To merit the issuance 
of a certificate of appealability, the defendant must 
make "a substantial showing of the denial of a consti-
tutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). As stated 
above, Dolbin has not shown that he was prejudiced 
by any of defense counsel's alleged inadequacies. 
Accordingly, reasonable jurists would agree that he 
has not made a showing of the denial of a constitu-
tional right, and there exists no basis for a certificate 
of appealability with respect to this motion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, Dolbin's 
motion to vacate, correct or modify sentence will be 
denied. Dolbin has not demonstrated ihat irial coun-
sel, appellate counsel, or pretrial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment rights. Because the Court was able to 
conclusively determine the merits of the motion 
without a hearing, Defendant's motions for hearings 
will also be denied. A certificate of appealability is 
unwarranted in this case. 
An order consistent with this memorandum follows. 
ORDER 
AND NOW, this 11th day of May 2010, upon con-
sideration of Mark Dolbin's motion to vacate, set 
aside and correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2255 (Doc. No. 250), motion for notice of setting for 
evidentiary fact-finding hearing (Doc. No. 272), con-
solidated motion for partial judgment on the plead-
ings (Doc. No. 266), and motion to dismiss as frivo-
lous and without merit government's motion to dis-
miss pro-se petitioner's section 2255 (Doc. No. 258), 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE 
MOTIONS are DENIED. A certificate of appeal-
ability shall not issue. 
M.D.Pa.,2010. 
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Addendum C 
Addendum C 
Opening Statements. The lawyers will outline what the ease is about and 
indicate what they think the evidence will show. 
Presentation of Evidence. The plaintiff will offer its evidence first followed by 
the defendant. Each side may also offer rebuttal evidence after hearing the 
witnesses and seeing the exhibits offered by the other side. 
Instructions on the Law. After each side has presented its evidence, I will 
supplement these written instructions and review them with you. 
Closing Arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. 
They will share with you their respective views of the evidence, how it relates to 
the law and how they think you should decide the case. 
Jury Deliberation. The final step is for you to retire to the jury room and 
deliberate until you reach a verdict. 
5. THE CHARGE(S) and THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
The defendant in this case has been accused of committing a crime. The 
accusation is in a written document called an INFORMATION, which will be 
read or summarized for you following this instruction. As you listen, keep in 
mind that the defendant has answered the charge by saying "not guilty." The 
defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charge. 
DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, 1673 § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), Utah Code Ann., as follows: That on or 
about March 10, 2009, at 575 West 200 South, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, f t e a s f c ^ luUk/Luu'T iim >^t TMii'i T^ir Au^__f 
ffigsr- v\i^4^did knowingly and intentionally distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, or agreed, consented, offered, or arranged to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance, to wit: Cocaine, a Schedule II controlled 
substance. 
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6. WHAT IS THE JURY'S ROLE IN THIS CASE? 
You must decide whether the charge against the defendant has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Your decision is called a VERDICT. Your verdict must be 
based only on the evidence produced here in court. It must be based on facts, not on 
speculation. Don't guess about any fact. However, you may draw reasonable 
inferences or arrive at reasonable conclusions from the evidence presented. 
7. WHAT IS EVIDENCE? 
Evidence is anything that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a disputed 
fact. It can be testimony, or documents, or objects, or photographs, or stipulations, or 
certain qualified opinions, or any combination of these things. Some times the lawyers 
may agree that certain facts exist. You should accept any agreed or stipulated facts as 
having been proved. In limited instances, I may take "judicial notice" of a well-known 
fact. If this happens, I will explain how you should treat it. 
8. OPINION TESTIMONY 
Under certain circumstances, witnesses are allowed to express an opinion. A 
person who by education, study or experience has become an expert in any art, science 
or profession, may give his opinion and the reason for it. A layman (or, a non-expert) 
is also allowed to express an opinion if it is based on personal observations and it is 
helpful to understanding his testimony or the case. You are not bound to believe 
anyone's opinion. Consider it as you would any other evidence, and give it the weight 
you think it deserves. 
9. WHAT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OR USED AS EVIDENCE? 
I've explained to you what evidence is. Now I'll tell you about some things 
which do not qualify as evidence or which, for some other good reason, you should not 
consider in reaching your verdict. 
Accusation. The fact that formal charges have been filed accusing the defendant 
of committing a crime is not evidence of guilt. 
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Punishment. You may be aware of the gravity of the offense charged and the 
range of potential penalties, but you should not consider what actual punishment 
the defendant may receive if found guilty. That is for the judge to decide based 
upon the applicable law. 
Right to Remain Silent. If the defendant chooses not to testify in this case, don't 
consider that as evidence of guilt. The Constitution provides that an accused 
person has the right not to testify and you should not draw any negative 
inferences based upon the reliance on this right. 
Lawyer Statements. What the lawyers say is not evidence. Their purpose is to 
give you a preview of expected evidence and to help you understand the 
evidence from their viewpoint. 
Personal Investigation. Evidence is not what you can find out on your own. 
You should not make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make 
personal inspections, observations or experiments. Do not view premises, things 
or articles not produced in court. Don't let anyone else do anything like this for 
you. Don't look for information in law books, dictionaries or public or private 
records which are not produced in court. 
Out of Court Information. Do not consider anything you may have heard or 
read about this case in the media or by word of mouth or other out-of-court 
communication. You must rely solely on the evidence that is produced and 
received in court. 
10. THE JUDGE DECIDES WHAT EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE 
Sometimes a question will be raised about whether certain evidence is proper for 
the jury to consider. This type of question is called an OBJECTION. I rule on 
objections. If an objection is SUSTAINED the evidence is kept out and you should not 
consider it. If an objection is OVERRULED the evidence comes in and you may 
consider it. If evidence is STRICKEN you should ignore it. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 27A 
The Court previously instructed you to delete certain language in Instruction No. 
5 which you have done. This Court prepared Instruction No. 5 from a standard set of 
Instructions and inadvertently included the language you have been asked to delete from 
another Instruction. It is not a part of this charge, was inadvertently included in it, and 
no evidence has been presented in this case to support such a statement. Accordingly, 
you should disregard that language. 
